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Re-generating the nation: 
Y outh, revolution and the politics 
ofhistory in Cöte d'lvoire 
Karel Amaut 
This chapter analyzes the discourse of generation and youth as 
it developed in the FESCI student movement of the 1990s in 
Cote d'Jvoire. The discourse 's centrat elements have been 
transferred to the present-day Young Patriots movement that is 
playing a centrat role in the formulation and imposition of a 
relatively new political project that can be characterized as 
autochthony-driven. Generation and youth are argued to be 
powerful instruments in any politics of history as they ambi-
valently encompass continuity and rupture, inclusion and 
exclusion. The FESCI in its time made important claims about 
the historical trajectory and nationwide importance of its revo-
lutionary struggle and the position of youth. These constructs 
are now being reclaimed by the Young Patriots in order to 
redefine their youth struggle in a political project that sees 
itself as a new stage in the emancipation of the lvorian people 
from neo-colonial oppression. However, this time around, the 
inclusiveness of the vaguely defined category 'Jvorian people' 
hides the awkward exclusion of an equally ill-defined but 
strategically broad category of allochthones. 
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Introduction 1 
The way is open, the signal has been given, the torch has just been handed over into 
the young, new, and unarmed hands that have no intention of grabhing a portfolio. 
(Dadie 2003: 170)2 
The new generation, the new youth of Cöte d'Ivoire wants, like that is the case in all 
countries, live freely, live autonomously, live independently in its country; That is 
ours, it is our country, our ancestors have given this to us. (Charles Groguhet, 19 
September 2003).3 
These two quotes - the former from a renowned octogenarian writer and the 
latter from a militia Ieader in his thirties - give a taste of the rhetoric of youth 
and generation that features prominently in Ivorian political discourse these 
days. As many observers have rightly pointed out, at least since the December 
1999 coup d'etat- sometimes called the coup d'etat desjeunes (Ble Goude, 21 
February 2000) - which removed President Henri Konan Bedie and his PDCI 
party (Parti Democratique de Ia Cote d'Jvoire) from power, youngsters have 
incessantly manifested themselves as new political actors (Konate 2002, 2003, 
Banegas & Marshall-Fratani 2000, Chauveau & Bobo 2003). This became even 
more apparent when the military insurgency of September 2002 resulted in the 
formation of two movements whose names strongly evoke rejuvenation: the 
'Young Patriots' (Jeunes Patriotes) who claim to defend the nation and its 
president, Laurent Gbagbo, against the rebels of the 'New Forces' (Forces 
Nouvelles) who, in turn, demand the immediate removal of the acting president 
as well as drastic institutional and constitutional changes. 
Reviewing the political situation in mid-2003, one youth Ieader and promi-
nent member of the Y oung Patriots' Alliance (Alliance des Jeunes Patriotes ), 
Damana Adia Pickas, declared: 
It is our generation that is at the centre of attention these days. There _are rebel chiefs 
who are of our generation, patriot chiefs who are of the same generatlon, an~ Ieaders 
of youth sections of political parties who provide equally from that generatlon. Y ou 
1 Research for this paperwas conducted in Cöte d'Ivoire and _among Ivorians in Europe 
(France, UK, Germany, and Belgium). I wish to thank all my mterlocutors and the many 
people who have facilitated my field research, especially Alyoun Badara Sall, Jean-
Marie Ahoussou, Koffi Koffi Didier, Jean Dekpai and Raymond Dakoua. 
2 All translations from French are mine. . . . 
3 References in which the exact date is specified refer to statements made m ?ubhc or m 
the course ofinterviews with me (between 2000 and 2003). For reasons ofpnvacy, I use 
pseudonyms (in italics in the text) for most of my interlocutors, and real names for 
authors of Statements made in public. 
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can observe with me that the effervescence which reigns in our count.ry today is a 
feat ofthat generation. So we have an important role to play not only m the FESCI 
but also in Cöte d'Ivoire. (Notre Voie, 2 June 2003) 
The loyalist Young Patriots and the insurgen~ New Forces a~e led by ag~-mates, 
Charles Ble Goude and Soro Kigbafori Gmllaume respectlvely, both young-
sters' in their thirties who share the experience of having been militants in the 
FESCI student union (Federation Estudantine et Scalaire de Cote d'Ivoire) 
during the 1990s.4 Although the Ivorian press and many observers regularly 
point out that the two junior political actors gained celebrity in the legendary 
FESCI movement, they themselves speak about those years in quite different 
terms. While Soro Guillaume often distances hirnself from bis past as a student 
leader to the extent of minimizing the importance of the movement, Ble Goude 
- tagether with many fellow Y oung Patriot leaders who were FES CI members -
publicly cherish the memory of their student activism. As explained elsewhere 
(Amaut 2004a), this difference in attitude towards their student past is 
embedded in differential discourses. The Y oung Patriots stress their youth-
fulness and present themselves as members of 'a new generation' that 
announces the birth of a new Ivorian nation. In contrast, the New Forces prefer 
to emphasize their maturity and avoid mentioning any divisions among Ivorian 
citizens and residents in terms of age, ethnicity, religion or ( even) nationality. 
This chapter explores the 'youth' and 'generation' rhetoric in Cöte d'Ivoire 
since the early 1990s, particularly in the FESCI student union and among the 
Y oung Patriots. It is argued that by galvanizing their historical links with the 
student union, the Y oung Patriots are reactivating significations and connect-
ions that were construed in the context of the deployment of the FES CI student 
movement in the 1990s, but inscribe these in a new political project that has all 
the makings of an autochthony movement. 
Two of the features of the current autochthony movement can already be 
discemed in the opening quotes of this chapter. Both Dadie and Groguhet 
present the movement in terms of 'young' and 'new' which, as will be seen, is 
reminiscent of the way the FESCI presented itself in its time. When Bemard 
Dadie allegesthat the 'hands' of the Young Patriots (whose praises he sings in 
this text) have 'no intention of grabhing a [ministerial] portfolio', he further 
evokes a series of meanings ranging from selfless commitment over patriotic 
sacrifice to revulsion against 'affairist' national politicians, which are also of 
4 
Both Soro Guillaume and Ble Goude held the highest position in the FESCI, that of 
secretary-general of the National Executive Bureau (Bureau Executif National- BEN). 
Soro Guillaume was secretary-general from 1995 until 1998 when he was replaced by 
Ble Goude who stayed on until early 2001. 
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FESCI provenance. Dadie employs these meanings to characterize the patriotic 
youth as an anti-political, grass-roots civil-society movement that seeks to 
express the wishes and anxieties of 'the people' rather than impose itself on 
them. Charles Groguhet hints more clearly at whose political and economic 
interests the Y oung Patriot movement ( to which he belongs) is dedicated to 
defend: those of Ivorians with ancestral connections within the country, in other 
words, the autochthones. 
Whereas in the concluding sections this chapter specifically addresses the 
revival of FES CI discourse by the Y oung Patriots and their supporters, the 
chapter focuses on the construction of 'youth/student' and 'generation' in the 
context of the FES CI student movement of the 1990s. The material used is from 
fieldwork among former militants of the student union. This field work, 
conducted over a discontinuous period of three years, was multi-sited and 
'multi-partisan'. I worked with former Fescists in Cöte d'Ivoire (mainly 
Abidjan) as well as with several who have been living in Europe since they left 
in the FESCI exodus of the mid-1990s. Among the local and dispersed ex-
F escists, Y oung Patriot enthusiasts as well as fans or even representatives of the 
New Forces rebel movement are to be found. However, the bulk of my 
interlocutors are self-consciously struggling to resist this dichotomization and 
trying to carve out a space for themselves in an attempt to develop a critical 
perspective on the current predicament of their country, as well as on their past 
student activism and the FESCI legacy in general. 
The oral and printed material which my research yielded is unravelled with 
the help of an analytic scheme that is presented in the following section. In a 
review of the sociological and anthropological Iiterature on youth and 
generation, the way in which both concepts can be used to mark continuities 
while indicating ruptures can be seen, and suggests inclusiveness while im-
posing exclusions. Both dimensions are extremely relevant. 
Firstly, the issue of constructing continuities and discontinuities. in:ites a 
look at how a youth movement or a 'new generation' situates itself or 1s sttuated 
in a Ionger history of political activism or in an 'ideological tradition'. It has 
been suggested (see for example, Bayart 2003) that the Young Patriots, together 
with President Gbagbo, need to be situated in a 'nationalist tradition' that harks 
back to the period of decolonization (1945-1960). However, it is argued her.e 
that this claim arises from a politics of history whereby, indeed through thetr 
reciprocal association, Gbagbo and the Y oung Patriots are trying to lay cl.aim to 
the 'nationalist tradition' not only to gain historical legitimacy for thetr new 
political projects but also to deny legitimacy to other 'natio~alists', not l~ast the 
ex-Fescists ofthe rebel movement, who are presently opposmg these proJects. 
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This brings us to the second issue of inclusion/exclusion. 'Youth' and 
'generation' refer to age-based cross-sections of a population and when 
associated with historical movements can serve to stress their 'popular' or 
'nationwide' character. However, as Groguhet's quote indicates, this vague all-
inclusiveness may cover up certain exclusions (for example, the equally vaguely 
defined category of 'allochthones'). Together then, these plays on continuities/-
discontinuities and inclusiveness/exclusivity feature in hegemonic struggles that 
consist of political claims on the vox populi, attempts to redefine citizenship, 
and economic options to Iimit redistribution to particular groups of citizens, for 
instance, autochthones. 
'Youth' and 'generation': The politics ofhistory and hegemonic 
struggles 
In the social sciences, 'generation' is ambivalently defined in terms of alter-
nation and flow, inclusion and exclusion. A textbook definition says that 
members of the same generation are 'contemporaries or [ ... ] descended by the 
same number of degrees from a common ancestor' (Bacon 1964: 284, author's 
italics ). Under the first condition ( contemporaries ), one can emphasize 
'simultaneity' (Dithey in Marias 1968: 89) or what Ortega (in ibid) calls 
'coevalness' and stress intra-generational cohesion, inclusion and solidarity, as 
weil as inter-generational conflict (Eisenstadt 1962/1995, Turner 1998). Under 
the second condition ( descent), the generation's specific location in historical 
time and social space is taken into account. From there, one can emphasize the 
fact that a generation constitutes itself or is constituted by events extemal to it 
(Mannheim in Bundy 1987: 305). What is more important in that respect is that 
a generation can include as much as it can exclude coevals such as women, non-
initiates or strangers (see Rintala in Marias 1968: 94). In such a conception, one 
can stressinter-generational 'dependency' (Blaikie 1999: 128) or 'the relations 
t~r~ugh ~hich successive gen_erations are bound in the reproduction of social 
~tfe (I~m 1998: 307), or, mdeed, demand attention for intra-generational 
mequahty and exclusion (Irwin 1996). 
Since its early use in anthropology, 'generation' induces research and 
refl~ctions on social and cultural conceptions of time, more particularly on how 
s~ctal . for:nations (including anthropologists) deal with continuity and 
dtscont~nmty. In one of the rare anthropological volumes dedicated to 
~eneratwns,_ age c~hort_s and social change, Spencer ( 1990: 18) remarks that 
the perce?tt~n of time m regard to ageing goes in steps rather than in a smooth 
flow, for ~~ ~s embedded in a chequered development of social relationships'. 
The opposttlon between time as a continuous flow and as a gradual process, 
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reflects the ideas Leach developed in two related essays- 'Cronus and Chronos' 
(1953) and 'Time and False Noses' (1955)- in which he distinguishes between 
'etemal time' that goes on and on (Chronos) and time conceptualized as 
zigzagging (Cronus) (in Hugh-Jones & Laidlaw 2000: 177, 181). In the latter 
case, 'time is experienced as something discontinuous, a repetition of repeated 
reversal, a sequence of oscillations between polar opposites: night and day, 
winter and summer, drought and flood, age and youth, life and death' (ibid: 
176). Interestingly enough, Leach illustrates this zigzag or pendulum con-
ceptualization of time with Radcliffe-Brown's findings about the identification 
of altemating generations (of grandmother and grandchild). Otherwise, Leach's 
pendulum conception of time-which he sees as underlying all rites de passages 
- rules out a continuous Chrono(s)-logical time conception (ibid: 183). How-
ever, that is precisely the point which Spencer extracts from V an Gennep' s and 
Tumer's work on rites de passage, namely that 'history is not just concemed 
with the [ etemal] succession of [ age] cohorts, but with the symbolic elaboration 
of [historical, unprecedented] events'. In summary, 'all persons are similarly 
structured in relation to the historical transitions of their time; and the symbols 
and myths that compose this structure are interwoven with those of the more 
personal and routine transitions of life' (Spencer 1990: 22). In general, I think, 
Spencer' s view helps us out of the impossible choice between time as rupture 
and time as flow. More importantly, it allows us to see how people mobilize the 
metaphoric of the 'routine transitions of life' - that is birth, youth and age-
cohorts, adulthood and death- in the way they Iabel, experience and/or contest 
'historical transitions' in terms of rebirth or infantilization, rejuvenation or 
senescence, and such like. 
A differential stress on continuity and discontinuity also affects the way in 
which youth is dealt with in anthropology, and more particularly how youth 
agency is valuated. In a review of the anthropological Iiterature on youth, 
Bucholtz (2002) distinguishes between an approach in terms of 'adolescence' or 
transition towards adulthood, and an ernerging anthropology of youth that 
stresses the 'here-and-now ofyoung people's experience': 
Y outh foregrounds age not as trajectory, but as identity, where identity is intended to 
invoke neither ... adolescence as a prolonged 'search for identity', nor [ a] rigid and 
essentialized concept. .. (Bucholtz 2002: 532; italics in the original) 
Here Bucholtz urges us to avoid both 'transition thinking' and reification in 
favour of accentuating youth agency and identity. Such a view, it could be 
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argued, may have prevented authors from summarizing, for instance, the history 
ofthe Senegalese students ofthe 20th century, in the following phrase: 5 
The intention of students to be involved in the life of their nation as members of 
civil society ... does not take into account the fact that they are only in transition, 
over which they have no control because they have no impact on the socio-economic 
stakes. So instead of being actors/initiators of this change, they have tumed into 
mere artefacts of this evolution ... (Bathily, Diouf & Mbodj 1995: 401) 
However, it is easier to be scandalized by the reduction of youth to a residual 
category (see Federici 2000: 50) than to remedy it without ending up with a 
view ofyouth that may crudely overstress youth's impact on society whether as 
liberators or as destroyers (see Seekings 1993). 
This chapter attempts to pave a way out of this dyadic trap by focusing on 
how youth at particular moments in time is politically, socio-economically and 
culturally constructed and constructs itself in contested discourses of history 
and society, continuity and rupture (see Burgessthis volume). My overall stance 
conceming the constructedness of 'youth' is aptly expressed in the following 
quote by Durharn (2000: 118) in a review of the anthropological Iiterature on 
youth in Africa: 
the conceptualization of cohorts and generational experience is deeply embedded in 
a politics of history. This is a politics of the present. ... Claims to the position of 
youth, claims about the nature of youth, and moral claims about youth are centrally 
involved in the reinvention of political and social space. They are used to mobilize 
similar kinds of temporal frameworks, in the negotiations of what kinds of power are 
available and where they can be exercised, and by whom. 
Durharn argues in favour of a doubly deconstructive focus on youth or 
generational 'identities'. Firstly, in a sense Durharn could be said to be 
responding to Bourdieu's (1985: 144) slightly immoderate claim that 'divisions 
in age cohorts or generations are entirely variable and constitute the object of 
manipulation' by pointing to the discursive limits/grounds of such manipu-
lability. 'Generation', Durharn claims, features in particular activations of 
'temporal frameworks' or in what Werbner (1999) calls 'politicized memory'. 
In this respect, Hall (1990: 225) remarks: 
Far from being grounded in a mere recovery of the past, which is waiting to be 
found, and which when found, will secure our sense of ourselves into etemity, 
5 
This quote does not do justice to an otherwise richly documented and properly argued 
paper. 
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identities are the names we give to the different ways we are positioned by, and 
position ourselves within, the narratives of the past. 
Secondly, Durharn intimates that 'youth' as an identity category is seen as a 
temporal and local outcome of hegemonic struggles of subjectification and 
power distribution. The negotiation of historical positions described by Hall 
takes place, as Roseberry (1996: 77) has put it, 'in the dynamic tension between 
discursive fields and social fields of force'. Thus, identity constructions are 
articulated 'within present social reality to create a specific route of 
empowerment' (V an Dijk 1998: 156). 
The above digression into the anthropological Iiterature on generation and 
youth demonstrates what many have hinted at ( see for example Comaroff & 
Comaroff2000) but only a few (such as Burgessthis volume) have taken much 
further, namely that generation and youth are discursive constructs in a politics 
of history and in hegemonic struggles. In both, I argue, generation and youth, 
because of what seems to be their inherent (cosmological?) ambiguity, are 
powerful instruments to ambivalently encompass continuity and rupture, 
inclusion and exclusion. In the following sections, how these constructs were 
strongly articulated in the context of the FES CI student movement in the course 
of the 1990s is examined. First, the issue of continuity is explored and the way 
it was articulated in terms of family descent and ideological filiation. In the two 
subsequent sections, I consider aspects of discontinuity as they are expressed in 
terms of 'the new (activist-based) family' and 'new (ideology-based) politics'. 
In the first and last sections, the issue of inclusionlexclusion is addressed by 
observing how the FESCI ambiguously associated and dissociated itself with 
regard to the 'populus'. 
Narratives of continuity: Reproduction and the emergence of a 
national generation 
The origins of the independent student union FES CI in 1990 are usually situated 
in the international context of new democratic impulses (South Africa, 
Germany) and the specific I vorian context of ongoing economic deterioration 
and social antagonisms (Akindes 2000, 2001 ). Within this context, many 
authors (Loucou 1992: 160, Proteau 2002: 100, Korrate 2002: 780, Bailly 1995: 
36) recount the same anecdote about power cuts that prevented students from 
properly preparing for their exams and that provoked the first stu~ent 
demonstrations on 19 February 1990. The repeated strikes and protest actwns 
that followed gave rise to a number of small student associations that later 
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joined tagether to form the FESCI federation, which presented itself as an 
alternative to the official govemment-controlled student association MEECI 
(Mouvement des Etudiants et Eleves de Cote d'Ivoire). Tagether with the new 
student unions, the existing independent teachers' unions SYNARES and 
SYNESCI, amongst others, demanded multipartyism and democratic elections.6 
In April 1990 the govemment gave in to the demands of the street and in May it 
officially recognized more than a dozen political parties and condoned a free 
press. From October onwards, a series of elections (presidential, parliamentary, 
and communal) were held, which confirmed the ruling PD CI' s power. 
When evaluating theserapid and drastic changes in Ivorian politicallife after 
more than thirty years of single-party rule, it is tempting to focus on the ferocity 
of the youth activists as the vanguard of a broad democratization movement. In 
conversations with former FESCI members on the early history of the student 
movement, my respondents do not so much play down the avant-garde qualities 
of the youth but rather historicize them. The overall image that arises from these 
discussions is that, from the very beginning, the youth movement presented 
itself as accomplishing a historical mission. The memories and documents of 
my interlocutors attest to the fact that from the start and throughout much of its 
later history the FESCI strongly situated itself as being embedded in a reform 
movement which spanned the entire history of Cöte d'Ivoire and concemed its 
entire people. 
In one conversation Bila Fote, who was a senior student in 1990, pointed out 
to me that the F ebruary riots were not the kind of spontaneaus expression of 
discontent they appeared to be. He recalled how ten days before the riots started 
a conference was organized by the writer and anti-Houphouetist activist Jean-
Marie Adiaffi and the Club Cheikh Anta Diop. 'I don't remernher the exact 
theme of the conference', he began by saying, 'but that was not important 
because conference themes were often a cover-up for voicing our collective 
protest against Houphouet.' He described how, towards the end of the 
conference, Professor Gore Bi of the Department of Oral Literature, and later a 
member ofthe Social Democratic Party (USD) of Zadi Zaourou, intervened: 
6 In 1970 two independent teachers' unions were created. The SYNESCI (Syndicat 
National de l'Enseignement Secondaire de Cote d'Jvoire) was for people working in 
secondary education, and was first led by the later founder of the RDR, Djeni Kobina. 
The SYNARES (Syndicat Africain de Recherche et de I 'Enseignement Superieur) was 
for researchers and those working in higher education. It was founded under Francis 
Wodie and included all other later socialist leaders (Laurent Gbagbo, Bemard Zadi 
Zaourou, and Bamba Morifere) among its members at one stage or another. 
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[Gore Bi] said he was deceived by our attitude: we shouted, we were happy, butthat 
was not what was expected from us. 'All the revolutions in the world,' he said 'were 
conducted by youngsters' and we were happy to just listen and shout. This has 
remained in my mind ever since. And in retrospect, I have connected it to the protest 
which broke out 10 days later, on 19 February 1990. It is true what he said. If you 
look at the French Revolution, Danton and Robespierre, they were youngsters. What 
Gore Bi asked of the youngsters was to make the country progress. (Bila Fote, 22 
September 2003) 
If Bila Fote makes it so und as if the intervention of GonS Bi provided a kind of 
'marching order' for revolutionary students, others among my interlocutors 
emphasize that even in this early period students claimed a certain agency in 
deliberating the potential import of their movement, and reflected on their 
actions as potential revolutionaries. 
Sanga Dogon (24 May 2003)- a fellow student activist of Bila Fotein the 
early days of the FES CI - recalled a debate which took place on the evening of 
19 F ebruary during which students discussed the significance of the power cuts 
and the street violence. According to Sanga Dogon, two opinions divided the 
assembly. One group saw students as an intermediary class between the elite 
and the masses. For them, the power cuts signalled the gradual 'pauperization of 
the intellectual elite [of students], whom were thereby tumed into some kind of 
proletariat'. The second group, whom Sanga Dogon considered to be the real 
revolutionaries, 'considered the power cuts as a symbol of the failure of the 
political system to cope with the economic recession since the early 1980s'. 
Arguing that 'we needed a new system altogether, a new social and economic 
dynamic', the second group, according to Sanga Dogon, saw its demands for 
better working conditions ( electricity at night) or for (student) scholarships as 
appeals to the govemment to satisfy the minimal conditions for the continued 
existence of 'students' as 'people who think; who reinvent the future of the 
nation' .7 In the debate, the second option won, according to Sanga Dogon, and 
with it the revolutionary ideas of the student union fraction of which he hirnself 
as weil as Bila Fote were members.8 
7 According to Bailly (1995: 36), in February 1990 the students protested against 
'obscurity and obscurantism'. In Sanga Dogon's classification, the first group can be 
seen reacting against 'obscurity', while the second group protested instead against the 
'obscurantism' ofthe govemment. 
8 Both Sanga Dogon and Bila Fote were leading members of CESCOCI, one of the 
most influential among the proto-Fesci student associations. CESCOCI provided the 
first two secretaries-general of FESCI, Amos Beugre and Ahipeaud Martial, and 
received financial support and ideological backing from the opposition heavyweight 
Bamba Morifere. 
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Leaving aside the differences of opinion, this reconstruction of the early 
history of the student movement captures the central concem of the students 
with different aspects of their reproduction, ranging from the role of students in 
the rejuvenation of the existing anti-Houphouetist Opposition, to their own 
reproduction as a class of intellectuals, to the reproduction of society or of the 
nation as a whole. The few sociological accounts of youth and students in Cöte 
d'Ivoire partly confirm this by considering the issue of reproduction in at least 
two different ways. In the 1980s several sociologists signalled what has been 
called 'the accumulation of youngsters' who find it increasingly difficult to 
become part of adult life and what this implies in terms of regular eamings and 
family responsibilities (Toure 1985: 287-88, Le Pape 1986; 112). Others have 
focused on the crisis in the reproduction of educated youngsters and observed 
how the cuts in education budgets yielded unequal access to education (Le Pape 
& Vidal 1987: 73) and led to the overall marginalization of young intellectuals 
in Cöte d'Ivoire in the 1990s (Proteau 2002). In the analysis that follows, I 
examine how youngsters have addressed these issues of reproduction in 
narratives of family history and in a metaphoric of ideological filiation. These 
narratives, I argue, give shape to the kind of continuities from which the 
F escists of the 1990s have arisen as a 'national generation'. 
Several former Fescists situated their juvenile activism in family narratives 
which in some way or another connect with historical anti-Houphouetism. They 
evoked the fact that their fathers or uncles were already opponents of 
Houphouet-Boigny as early as the 1940s or later. Others have broken off 
relations with their families because of the latters' clientelist obligations 
towards the PDCI party. But even if their families had no political history, 
several former Fescists have recounted the predicament of their forebears as 
resulting from the despised politics of the ruling party. They portray their 
parents as poor peasants who had small plantations and whose revenues were 
scarce because the single-party state paid low prices to (small) planters, 
received high prices on the world market, and used the money for its own 
enrichment.9 
With the help of family stories, the former Fescists have firmly inscribed 
their student activism in larger narratives that span the entire political and socio-
~conomic history of Cöte d'Ivoire since its first steps on the way to 
mdependence. This same historical scope can also be found back in the 
documents which my respondents provided me with. In a sense, these official 
9 
For. reasons of space I cannot include original statements illustrating the family 
narratives of former Fescists. Quoting and interpreting them requires the presentation of 
a good deal of contextual and historical information for which there is no space here 
(see Amaut 2004a). 
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Figure 5.1: 1992-1993 FESCI membership card. 
documents spell out, in terms of ideological filiation, what the family narratives 
explicate in terms ofkin-based experiences. 
In 1995 the FESCI published a booklet that was entirely dedicated to the 
history of the Ivorian student movement from the 1950s until FESCI's creation 
in 1990. 10 In the preface the then secretary-general Soro Guillaume claims that: 
There is a certain continuity in the struggle of the student youth for about half a 
century: this continuity resides in the fact that, apart from its corporatist claims, the 
youth continues to occupy an avant-garde position in the global movement for the 
Iiberation ofthe Ivorian people. (FESCI 1995: 3) 
10 The 1995 brochure was published at a time when the student union was trying to 
rebuild itself after (i) many Fescists had already left and were leaving the country, (ii) 
heavy repression had frightened many militants into hiding or forced them to abandon 
the struggle, and (iii) intema1 disputes had divided the FESCI membership. The 1995 
publication coincided with (i) the belief that after the unanimous election of Soro 
Guillaume as secretary-general in February 1995, the student movement could retrieve 
its past strength, and (ii) the hope that democratic presidential elections (in 1995) could 
remove President Bedie from office. While the latter hope proved to be an illusion, the 
form er belief largely materialized. 
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The genealogy which the folder constructs is that between the FESCI and the 
UGECI, which was created in 1956 and protested heavily against the mounting 
pro-colonial attitude of the Ivorian leadership. 11 After eight pages of detailed 
historical reconstruction, the folder concludes that: 
Today, the spirit of UGECI is revived in the spirit of the FESCI which cannot die 
because it goes in the sense ofhistory. (ibid: 11) 
While the family narratives often explicate the position of the youngsters in 
negative terms ( of anti-Houphouetism), the 1995 brochure is formulated in a 
more constructive (ideological) way, not least by evoking the ongoing project of 
the Iiberation of the Ivorian people. From this positive, or perhaps Counter-
hegemonie discourse, the Cöte d'Ivoire of Houphouet-Boigny is seen as a 
historical deviation from the right course ( the sense of history) which was set by 
certain former student movements and which the FESCI continues to chart. 
This, Mare Dounga (1 March 2003) expresses aptly when he recounts how he 
was pursued by the state as a mob Ieader and an agitator (meneur de troupes). 
'Yes, we the Fescists,' he says, 'were considered to be des eclaireurs de 
conscience of Cöte d'Ivoire.' Read as a military term in the context of 
Dounga 's battle with the regime, eclaireur (scout) signifies 'precursor' or 
'explorer' engaged in reconnaissance. Taken in the more literary or academic 
sense induced by 'conscience'' eclaireurs (guides) refers to the intelligentsia 
(the 'illuminati' in Dounga's metaphoric) who, as Sanga Dogon (24 May 2003) 
said before, take it on themselves to 'reinvent the future ofthe nation'. 
In this rhetoric of militant vanguards and intellectual torchbearers the 
Fescists reveal the full ambiguity with which they simultaneously identify' with 
the nation or the Ivorian people, and differentiate themselves from it. This 
ambivalence, I argue, is largely sustained by the metaphors of generation and 
youth. The latter terms can combine continuity with rupture as weil as exclusion 
with inclusion. In all, youth and generation are powerful discursive instruments 
for ~rticulating the multi-layered crisis of reproduction that the student youth 
feit 1t was entangled in. 
11 ~he controversies ofthe 1950s mainly centered around (i) the decision by Houphouet-
BOigny and,the PDCI to break ?ffall ties with the French Communist Party in 1950 (the 
so-ca~led desapparentement), (u) the acceptance of the Loi-Cadre of 1956 which critics 
feit dt~ not go ~ar. enough in the dir~ction of independence, and (iii) the Ivorian Ieaders' 
enthustasm to. JO~n the Franco-Afncan community in 1958 - a stance that different 
student orgamzatwns bluntly rej ected ( de Benoist 1994 Diarra 1997 · 56-64 Proteau 
2002: 61-98). ' . ' 
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In May 1994, the FESCI published a pamphlet containing a poem authored 
by 'The Voice of 25 Fescists Detained at the National Police School and at the 
State Security Police (DST)' (Figure 5.2). In two stanzas the poem associates 
the humiliation and the suffering of 'a youth' with that of 'a country' and 'a 
people'. 
My parents; I have experienced detention and I have been ashamed 
Y es, I have bcen ashamed and what kind of shame? 
The shame of a country 
The shame of a people 
The shame of a youth. 
Towards the end, the poem qualifies the shame as that which is 'armed to the 
teeth with guns, truncheons, electric whips, and torture chairs', but predicts that 
some day this shame will only be 'a memory on the triumphant path to real 
liberty'. 
In statements such as those, dramatically voiced from the centres of 
repression, the geographical, historical and sociological contours of the student 
movement dissolve into that of an entire country and a whole people, their 
history and their future. Under critical conditions, FESCI activists speak out in 
the name of a student population that sees its existence threatened by fierce 
repression and its reproduction under jeopardy by austerity measures and 
disqualification. In the above-mentioned poem, as in the entire genealogical 
discourse of families and ideologies, FESCI seems to put the ultimate hope of 
its reproduction in the hands of the Ivorian society as a whole. This people, the 
family narratives illustrate, continued (throughout its history of subjugation and 
repression) to produce the kind of youth that guarantees its future Iiberation. 
This claim is formulated in the mission statement that was published in one of 
the few official documents that the organization produced - more than three 
years after its foundation in 1990. 
The autonomaus and apolitical movement which we take upon ourselves, expresses 
the will of a new Ivorian youth to fight for a better life and to assume its historical 
role which consists in taking position in a societal project that takes shape in the 
popular aspirations. (FESCI 1993, this author's italics) 
While both the 1994 poem and the 1993 mission statement tie together the fate 
of the youth with that of the people, both documents also mark certain ruptures 
and exclusions. Parent (in French), the addressee of the poem, could be 
wrongly interpreted as any parent or family member but 'parent' in Fesci-speak 
signifies 'member of the new (political or union) family' and implies a 
distancing from the biological family. This rupture finds its political counterpart 
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Federstion Estudi~ntine & Scolaire de Cöte d'lvoire 
.F •. E. S. C. I. 
I 
~ 
l .. a honte 
Mes parents ; j'ai vecu la detention et j'ai connu la honte 
oui j'ai connu la honte et quelle honte ? 
Ia honte d'un pays 
la honte d'un peuple 
. Ia honte d'une jeunesse 
la-veritable honte incamee 
Mes amis ; mes camarades de lutte, j'ai vu la honte en personne et 
j'ai mal a mon pays 
j'ai mal a mon peuple 
j'ai mal ä ma jeunesse. 
Car j'ai vu Ia honte de sa destinee, 
la honte assasine de liberte 
Oui j'ai vecu la honte, et quelle honte ? 
Une honte indescriptible. La ponte de lendemains in·eertains parce que obscurcis par 
des pcrsonnes hClas peu honteuses. · 
Et j'ai vu Ia honte planer comme cherchant une proie et se poser sur mon 
. pays. 
Assitot, j'ai vu une jeunesse prompte et spontanee lutter contre la honte. La 
Iutte fut äpre. Mais Ia honte fut vaincue malgre eile. 
Alors mes amis, j'ai vu la honte, une honte meconnaissable s'en aller la 
qucue entre les pattes, la tete hasse, confuse et honteuse 
Et unevive lueur d'espoir a pointe a l'horizon ec]airant le Visage des lutteurs. 
Dcsorzr:ais la ~onte, oui Ia veritable honte, cette honte qui brutalise des jeunes gens, 
traumause Ies Jeunes Iutteurs pour leur arracher des aveux 
C;t!e honte ~ue j'ai connue. ne se!3 qu'un souvenir sur Ja ;oie triomphale de la liberte yen~ble qut comme. Je bten tnomphe du mal, triomphera de cette honte armee 
Jusqu aux dents de fusds, de matraques, de fouets electrique7de chaises de torture. 
Adieu honte houteuse. 
Ecole de Poliee.le 31 Mai 1994. La voix des 25 Fescistes detenus 
a I'Ecole Nationale de Police et a Ia D. S., .. T. 
Figure 5.2: Poem 'La honte' by 'The Voice of 25 Fescists Detained at the 
National Police School and at the State Security Police (DST)'. 
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in the mission statement which presents the movement as apolitical. By calling 
itself apolitical, the FES CI maintains its distance from regular party politics and 
situates its goals at the higher (ideological) Ievel of a societal project. Both 
ruptures feature in a broader positioning of the student youth as simultaneously 
acting with and somehow separately from the people. This fundamental 
ambiguity is examined later as being handled with techniques of populism and 
crowd management. 
Social ruptures: The invention of the new family 
By the end of 1989 and in his last year of secondary school (lycee) in Abidjan, 
Aganda Soul decided to join FESCI, which was then headed by Ahipeaud 
Martial. Although he never became a national FES CI Ieader, Aganda Soul was a 
strong activist and an important recruiter of the student union until 1995. Much 
later he co-founded the Ivorian Movement for Youth Rights (MIDJ) and is 
currently directing an intemationally operating anti-globalist organization in 
Abidjan. Looking back on more than a decade of what he calls his 'communist 
engagement' in the struggle of the Left (Ia Iutte de gauehe ), Aganda Soul (24 
September 2003) muses: 
Weil at a certain time we did not have the occasion to live with our natural families 
but ~e had the chance of living with another political or trade union family (jamille 
politique ou syndicale) [ ... ] What a political friend or a friend from the union (un 
ami politique ou syndicale) has done for me, even a relative (un parent) has not 
done. My studies have been paid by my political friends. My parents said that I was 
lost. It is only now that some of my kinsfolk speak to me. When I joined the FESCI, 
my elder brother chased me from the hause. (this author's italics) 
As was also observed by Konate (2002: 785) and Proteau (2002: 152-54), the 
'parent-talk' of the Fescists is both important and highly significant. In my 
conversations with former Fescists, 'family' can refer to kin-based ('natural') or 
activist-based (party, union) socialities but can also function as a metaphor for 
the educational or the state system, administered by school and university 
authorities ( elders ), and ultimately controlled by the president in the figure of 
the 'Father ofthe Nation'. 
Parental reactions to their sons' and daughters' activism in the FESCI ranged 
from explicit agreement, to resignation, or to fierce opposition. These reactions 
often had a direct effect on the living conditions of the students as weil as on 
their academic curriculum. The ill-fated -like Aganda Soul who lost all family 
support because of his activism - either sought alternative funding from the 
sponsors ( elders, professionals) of the wider opposition movement or joined the 
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personal support networks of more privileged students. Kakou Bi, currently a 
colleague of Aganda Soul in the anti-globalist movement, was among those 
fortunate enough to have a father who supported bis activism. He recalls that 
during bis time in the FESCI: 
My room was called 'the palace of the people'. I kept my key in a place where 
everybody knew where it was. Y ou come in, you eat, you sleep .... 
One's natural family had become one's comrades-in-arms (camarades de Iutte). 
Really, it was all about sharing. Hence the word parent. Many comrades had been 
rejected by their parents. For many years they lived with FESCI members. We paid 
their fees, we put them up, and we fed them, because that was the idea: one must 
share everything, the misery and the joy. (Kakou Bi, 23 September 2003) 
While Aganda Soul uses 'relative' (parent) and 'friend' (ami) to distinguish 
between the 'natural' and the 'new' family, Kakou Bi intimates the substitution 
of the latter by the form er and situates this switch in the term parent. Indeed, the 
'new family' in the fullest sense of the word was given shape in the 
resignification of the word 'parent'. Very soon after FES CI' s foundation in 
1990 the word parent was used to refer to any fellow activist. 12 
The resignification of parent is not so much the change in its meaning, rather 
its referent. Parent can point to any member of the 'union family', but retains 
its full meaning in terms of material and moral support. 13 Like any 'natural 
family', the new family also has its relative elders and youngsters. 'Eider' 
parents are members of the extended 'political family' who are either active in 
Opposition politics (for example, Bemard Zadi Zaourou, Bamba Morift~re and 
Laurent Gbagbo) or members of the independent unions (SYNARES and 
SYNESCI) who actively supported the F escists in general or individual 
members or small groups of them in particular. 
The 'new family' thus constituted, stories about the 'natural family' and the 
break away from its stifling grip ( embrigadement) lead us into the realm of 
r~pression against the FESCI activists. This repression took the form of open 
vwl~nce by the armed forces, official exclusion from school (radier) or from 
spectfic departments (n?orienter). Moreover, repression also extended into the 
12 
According to Bila Fote (22 September 2003), in the early days of the student 
movement parent was used as a password among student activists. When a student 
entered a room where a clandestine meeting was being held, one asked him whether he 
or. she was a parent. V~ry soon, however, the password was known by friend and foe 
~3hke and was used p~bhcly as an identity label. 
Parent was so~etlmes used as a term of reference, such as in the sentence J'etais le 
chefdes parents a Yopougo~ ('I was the head of the student activists at Y opougon '), but 
also as a term of address, as m the salutation 'he parent' ('hey comrade'). 
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private sphere and led to tragic family ruptures and exclusion from home. In a 
group conversation with former Fescists now living in Germany, Mandege 
Louis (1 March 2003) recalls the conflict he bad with bis elder brother who was 
financially responsible for him after their father died at an early age. It was not 
so much that bis brother was against bis student activism, Mandege Louis 
explained, but apparatchiks from the PDCI ruling party threatened to sackbis 
brother if he could not persuade bis younger relative to abandon the FES CI. The 
threat was enormous: if bis elder brother lost bis job as a civil servant, the 
whole extended family would suffer. 
To summarize, the invention of the 'new (FES CI) family' served to create a 
novel, activist-based sociality that marked a clear rupture with the immediate 
society. In the way the new family was articulated by the form er F escists one 
can observe how youngsters, in the words of Eisenstadt (1995/1962: 77) 
'rebelled against their elders and the traditional familistic setting with its stress 
on the latter's authority'. More than that, the metaphor of the 'new family' 
served to visualize a gerontocratic complex - the interpenetration of the 
authority of the 'natural family' and that of the state which continued to be 
ruled by the old PDCI party. However, in contrast to what Eisenstadt indicates, 
in statements by former Fescists, the despised 'traditional' aspect of the family 
or the system is not so much identified as cultural in the sense of ethnic or 
'tribal' but as political in the sense of political culture or established ways of 
conducting politics. 
Political rupture and the break with 'ancestral politics' 
When Houphouet died and Bedie took over [in December 1993], I was in prison 
[together with a number of other Fescists]. Within weeks, Bedie sent one of his 
ministers to come and tellusthat 'the Cöte d'Ivoire of the grandfather is no more' 
(Ia C6te d'Ivoire du grand-pere est depasse). We knew what it meant: the system 
would become even morerepressive and [this repressionwas tobe] directed against 
specific personalities. (Mare Dounga, 1 March 2003) 
In the above excerpt, Mare Dounga recalls that when 'grandfather' Houphouet-
Boigny died, Bedie took on the role of the 'father' who more directly 
supervised, personally manipulated, and (if unsuccessful) mercilessly penalized 
bis disobedient 'children'. 14 According to Sanga Dogon (24 May 2003), the 
14 Interestingly, the 1993 political transition is presented in terms of altemating 
generations and hints at the system widely known throughout (West) Africa of joking 
relationships between grandparents and grandchildren whereby the child-parent rela-
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shift from the violent but 'patemalistic' repression by Houphouet-Boigny to the 
more ruthless methods of Bedie had the effect of rendering the FESCI 
leadership more mistrustful and rude, and resulted in the movement stepping up, 
what he calls, its 'logic of rupture' (Ia logique de rupture). 15 This is exemplified 
by three parallel developments in the post-1993 era: the radicalization of the 
movement, 'distancing' through expatriation, and the autonomization from 
politics. Among these three, the latter requires most attention here because it 
subscribes most forcibly to the overall image of the FES CI as an anti-political, 
popular movement. 
FESCI's radicalization can be measured from new developments in its overt 
and covert actions. In response to the mounting and more incisive repression of 
the Bedie regime, the FES CI employed more extreme methods of protest- such 
as hunger strikes- to its standard range of public demonstrations (Proteau 2002: 
158). Simultaneously, it reorganized itself intemally and set up shadow 
command structures such as a substitute national council and underground 
action groups to ensure it was less vulnerable to govemment repression against 
its public agitators. 16 
This intemal redeployment of FESCI activism had its outward-bound, 
geopolitical counterpart in the massive exodus of Fescists from Cöte d'Ivoire to 
Europe. Between 1994 and 1996 an estimated 3,000 Fescists and students left 
the country: first to London and later to Germany, the N etherlands and 
Denmark. 17 The expatriationwas not only an escape from 'fatherly' repression 
under Bedie, but was also set up and seen as an astute contribution to the FES CI 
struggle. None of the Fescists went into exile in France. 'We were all anti-
French,' explained Sanga Dogon (25 May 2003). 'For us, the Houphouet 
tionship is seen as more 'serious'. See for example, Griaule (1948) and Drucker-Brown 
(1982). 
15 The repression against the student movement occurred in a legal vacuum. By June 
1991 the studentunionwas publicly outlawed but this banwas never legally formalized 
by the govemment. In defiance of its prohibition, the FESCI continued to demonstrate 
while its members and sympathizers were persecuted. Fescists who fell into the hands 
of the security forces - whom the F escists called !es forces du des ordre - were detained 
in prisons, army camps and police stations around the country, often without being 
officially charged. There they underwent physical torture and psychological maltreat-
ment (Amnesty International 1994). 
1 ~ Former Fescists are still very discrete about covert action groups and secret opera-
tlons but none of them denies that they were important and increasingly so in the second 
half of the 1990s (Nien Fa & Mare Dounga, 5 August 2003 · Boda Goro 15 March 
2003). ' ' 
~ 7 This exo~us mor~ or less came to a standstill in 1996 when all European countries 
mtroduced VIsa reqmrements for lvorian visitors. 
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system only survived because of its neo-colonial relationship with France.' On 
non-French territory, many student refugees resumed their university studies 
while organizing themselves in political associations with the explicit goal of 
continuing the revolutionary struggle. 18 The rupture exemplified in the 
extraterritorial deployment of the student opposition forces was framed as 
doubly effective. The student diaspora broke away from neo-colonial Cöte 
d'Ivoire (and its French patrons) and was meant to produce new intellectuals 
whose dispersion across Europe embodied the awaited multilateral geopolitics 
ofthe future Cöte d'Ivoire. 
If by going underground the FES CI was trying to safeguard its struggle from 
intervention by a repressive regime, and by going abroad it was avoiding neo-
colonial dependency, the FESCI also spelled out its autonomization by 'going 
ideological' and thereby dissociating itself from established political practice. 
This needs to be understood in the wider political context of the 1990s. 
When in April 1990 the govemment gave in to the demands of the street and 
introduced multipartyism, the junior and senior opposition activists organized 
themselves in almost inverse ways. On the one band, small anti-govemment 
student unions merged into the single FESCI federation that was able to impose 
a monopoly of student representation on the campus. 19 On the other band, the 
left-wing political movement crystallized into four small socialist parties built 
around former trade unionists: the FPI of Laurent Gbagbo, the PIT of Francis 
Wodie, the PSI of Bamba Morifere, and the USD of Zadi Zaourou.20 The 
contrast between the monolithic student movement and the fragmented 
'democratic left' sharpened even further after 1993. 
The death of Houphouet-Boigny heralded a political reshuffling of con-
siderable consequence. In 1994 the ruling PDCI party broke up into a more 
'nationalist' fraction represented by President Bedie and a more neo-liberal 
fraction which in 1994 converted into the new political party, the RDR 
' ' (Rassemblement des Republicains) of former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara. 
In the face of this political rearrangement, the left-wing opposition fragmented 
18 In 1994 former FESCI militants set up the MOIRA (Movement oflvorian Opponents 
in Germany) in Cologne. In 1996 this organization was partly repla.ced b_Y the U~P 
(People's Socialist Union) and the MLTCI (Movement for the Total LiberatiOn of Cot.e 
d'Ivoire), both of which bad their headquarters in London but regrouped antl-
govemment militants dispersed all over Europe. . 
19 This situation of absolute hegemony remained uncontested untll very recently ~J~ne 
2004) when a new student union emerged under the name of AGEECI (~ssoczat~on 
Generale des Eleves et Etudiants de Cote d'Ivoire). Apparently, AGEECI s creahon 
provoked fierce reactions from the FESCI leadership (Fraternite Matin, 28 June 2004). 
2° FPI: Front Papulaire Jvoirien; PIT: Parti Ivoirien des Travailleurs; PSI: Parti 
Socialiste Jvoirien; USD: Union des Socio-Democrates. 
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further. While some old-time opposition figures, such as Bernard Zadi Zaourou 
and Jean-Marie Adiaffi, joined Bedü~'s PDCI government, others like former 
SYNESCI leader Djeny Kobina co-founded the RDR. To make the ideological 
confusion complete, a number of socialist parties - most notably Laurent 
Gbagbo's FPI party- formed a strategic alliance with the newly created neo-
liberal RDR. This anti-Bedie coalition called the Republican Front (Front 
Republicain) lasted until 1999 when it collapsed in the run-up to the 2000 
elections in which Gbagbo and Ouattara both decided to stand as presidential 
candidates. 
The F escists perceived these rather bewildering reconfigurations of the 
Ivorian political scene during the 1990s as the result of 'big men' politics and 
former Fescists often speak in that respect of the post-1990 'multipartisan' 
instead of 'multiparty' system. The FESCI thus developed a discourse of 
rupture and autonomy in which it dissociated itself from opportunistic and 
personalistic party politics (politique politicienne) and emphasized its 
ideological tenacity. 
One dramatic event in which FESCI expressed its autonomy from 
established political practice was the deposition of FESCI Secretary-General 
Eugene Djue in September 1994. Having been accused of surreptitiously 
accepting money from President Bedie in return for destabilizing the FESCI 
from within, Djue was precipitately replaced as the head of the FES CI by Jean 
Ble Guirao.21 In a pamphlet on the matter, the new secretary-general put the 
FES CI leadership' s decision in a broader light: 
B~yond. the sanctions against Djue, it is the manifest wish of a generation to break 
wtth th1s ancestral past that pursues it relentlessly. (FESCI pamphlet 12 October 
1994) ' 
~ere, Ble Guirao denounces the repeated attempts of the system to buy its way 
mto the student movement and calls upon the latter to express its independence 
a~d. demo~strate its defiance. The tradition of corrupting opponents and 
?1ss1d~nts mto compliance is also evoked in the 1995 FESCI 'history' brochure 
m wh1ch Secretary-General Soro Guillaume declares: 
Facing the persistent.attitude of surrendering, of compromising, and even ofbetrayal 
ofthe People by the mtellectuals, there is, for the Present New Generationandin the 
21 
The list ofFESC.I Ieaders who were either accused of collaborating with 'the system' 
or eventually g~ve m to pressures from it is long. Accusations of treason were not only 
spread by Fesctsts but also by government agents who tried to destabilize the student 
movement. 
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Superior interest of the People, achallenge to take up. (FESCI 1995: 11, capitals in 
original) 
What Guirao identifies as 'ancestral', Soro Guillaume qualifies as the 'persist-
ing' political practice of clientelism, corruption and cooptation that emasculates 
the entire political domain including certain 'elder brothers' of the left-wing 
opposition parties. In the face of this, both FESCI leaders posited a break and 
announced the emergence of a 'new generation' of political actors. These 
actors, it was established in the same 1995 document, saw themselves as 
'ideological' in the sense of being led by firm principles, the origins of which 
were situated in the 1950s and to which they stuck with heroic tenacity. At the 
same time, the FESCI adopted the image of an anti-political movement that 
struggled for and with 'the people' as distinct from the restricted group of 
political elites. Nevertheless, this self-presentation of the FESCI as a popular 
movement relied on more than the kind of rhetoric illustrated above. It was 
equally sustained by a comprehensive strategy of popular mobilization and 
specific populist tactics by which the FESCI imposed itself as the exemplary 
civil-society organization that voiced the wishes of the Ivorian youth and, by 
extension, those ofthe entire Ivorian people. 
The organization of popular expression 
There can be no New School without a genuine democracy. 
(Il ne peut y avoir d'Ecole Nouvelle sans une democratie veritable.) (Slogan on 
FESCI's membership card, see Figure 5.1.) 
More than just demanding genuine democracy, the FES CI also put it into 
practice through a whole range of actions and events that explored and activated 
alternative ways of political expression. These included mass meetings, sit-ins 
and marches, sometimes accompanied by street violence. As one formerFeseist 
summarized it, the FESCI was above all an 'organization of mobilization' 
(Boda Goro, 15 March 2003). Sanga Dogon explained this as follows: 
In order for the movement to become a societal phenomenon, it is necessary that the 
students crystallize themselves on FESCI's structure. An organization that does not 
demonstrate, that does not mobilize, dies. So, whenever there was an occasion we 
protested but not only by means of declarations, but also with the masses, with 
meetings. (Sanga Dogon, 24 May 2003) 
Here, Sanga Dogon explains how the FESCI incessantly demonstrated its 
ability to mobilize crowds of students, whether by assembling them in a car 
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park at the Cocody campus, by bringing them together for a sit-in in front of the 
town hall, or by having them traverse the city from the Y opougon halls of 
residence (cite) to the Plateau administrative centre in Abidjan. Apart from 
some sticks and stones and a few charges of the so-called Baule tear gas 
(lacrymogime Baute) that students used to attack govemment cars or public 
buildings, they used no weapons other than their own bodies to block the 
streets, and their slogans and songs that offended the regime and its sym-
pathizers. 22 The overall image of FES CI activism that arises from the way the 
student movement occupied the urban and national public space is one of 
spontaneous expression and impulsive behaviour that emerged from the 
revolutionary instinct of its members. In the following quote, Mandege Louis 
connects his own revolutionary feelings and the street violence with FESCI's 
double demand for educational and political reform. 
I was a rebel (revolte), the systembotbered me. While smashing up a car or blocking 
a street, I feit comfortable because I told myself that it was they who were 
preventing the school system from developing, it was they who were preventing the 
people from fully playing their role. 
However, like many other former Fescists I spoke to, Mandege Louis qualifies 
the grass-roots view of initiative and achievement and, later in the conversation 
demanded attention for the way FESCI transformed, channelled and structured 
the students' discontent. 
The whole issue was to pass from the stage of a rebel (revolte) who blocks the 
streets to that of a revolutionary (revolutionnaire) who speaks of the advent of a new 
society. (Mandege Louis, 1 March 2003) 
When dealing with the matter of revolutionary practice, form er F escists focus 
on the command structure and the techniques used by the FESCI leadership to 
conduct the mobilization it triggered. That mobilization in itself, Sango Dogon 
explained in the opening quote of this section, was the work of the FESCI 
leadership who were keen to create incidents or ready to respond to any 
govemment provocation. For former Secretary-General Oko Meneda (22 
September 2003) 
· · · that :vas our method of mobilization, our method of conquest, so to speak; we 
were tmlers (bosseurs ), we were robots; we taught the youngsters to sacrifice 
themselves and to receive nothing in retum. 
22 
'L ' B I ' acrymogene au e was a self-made tear-gas bomb containing a mixture of kaolin 
and pepper powder. 
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For persuading the FESCI membership and the students to participate selflessly 
in the action, the FESCI leadership used a certain authority that it borrowed, 
among others, from the military and the school system. As for the former, 
FES CI gave its active members military ranks such as 'general' for the 
secretaries-general, 'colonel' or 'captain' for their deputies (adjoints), and 
'sergeant' for ordinary members. 
That was first of all a question of discipline, but also [meant] to give a bit of courage 
to all of us who were confronting the police and the army. At the moments when 
they attacked us grievously we did not have weapons but only our ranks. (Ramses 
Sery, 25 May 2003) 
The 'militarization' ofthe FESCI leadership also resulted in some ofthem using 
nicknames with clear military overtones, such as Che, Sankara or Sadam, or in 
naming their local sections after sites of (past) military conflict such as Kivu, 
Kosovo or Beirut. By qualifying its struggle as a military one and by associating 
itself with international revolutionary celebrities, the FESCI leadership can be 
said to have been 'heroizing' itself. 
The second register of authority from which the FESCI leadership extracted 
power was the school system. For the public distribution of information or 
instructions, the leadership had recourse to pamphlets or flyers called 'TDs'. In 
normal university life, TD means Travaux Diriges (guided works) and signifies 
all sorts of written assignments performed under the supervision of a teacher or 
lecturer. The FESCI TDs are similar in that they formulate an instruction to be 
carried out. In most cases, FESCI TDs contain a call (mot d'ordre) for a strike, 
a demonstration or some other impromptu action by which the student Ieaders 
who formulate them arrogate the position of an 'academic authority'. 
Gathering authority from specific registers of hierarchy and obedience, the 
FESCI leadership instituted a state of alert on the campus, which required 
urgent and concerted action such as demanding the Iiberation of a FES CI Ieader 
from prison or the cancellation of a decision by a school authority to expel a 
group of insubordinate pupils. As a consequence, Mandege Louis (1 March 
2003) explains, 'there was never much time to reflect on what all this meant'. 
Apart from the few who brought themselves to read Mao or Marcuse or who 
received some ideological guidance from 'elder brothers' in the broader 
Opposition movement, there was no other training for the majority of the 
militants than that which they received 'in the field' (sur le terrain) and that 
was dictated by the pressing needs of the moment. This modus operandi could 
be found back in the relative importance or unimportance of certain posts in the 
FESCI national council. There, the national secretary responsible for instruction 
(jormation) was far less important than the key functions of 'organization' and 
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'information' - the two pillars on which the student movement rested: the 
mobilization of students and the direction in which they marched. 
If the FESCI leadership employed a number of powerful instruments to 
guide the movement from above, it equally exercised control over the 
production of revolutionary ideas and plans that emerged from below. 
During these [ mass] meetings students adopted the habit of talking in public and 
some did very well. There were those who really stirred up the crowd, who guided 
(oriente) the students. Those we got afterwards for a function in the BEN [National 
Executive Council). 
But we could not have complete confidence in the crowd (Ia foule) because the 
crowd needed to be organized. Therefore we used the technique of the 'guided 
synthesis' (Ia synthese orientee). When everybody had spoken, someone from the 
[FESCI] leadership provided a synthesis of the debate whereby the conclusion that 
the leadership favoured was presented as the only feasible one and was then 
approved by the crowd. (Sanga Dogon, 24 May 2003) 
This quote provides one of the finest descriptions of what could be called 
FESCI populist tactics. It reveals a sophisticated combination of student 
empowerment through free expression and crowd management by which the 
inflamed student masses were turned into compliant followers of the FESCI 
leadership. This method of organizing the elicitation of consensus, I believe, is 
part and parcel of FES CI' s search for hegemony among the students and 
sustains the claim that the students voice 'popular aspirations'. 
This examination of how FESCI organized popular expression both from 
above and below ends this analysis of the FESCI discourse of youth and 
generation, and how this discourse featured in wider strategies to carve a space 
of alternative political representation for itself. This claim on representation was 
based on constructions of continuities and ruptures, inclusions and exclusions. 
Ov~rall, FESCI. ins.cribed itself in the long battle of the Ivorian people for 
nati.o?al emanctpatiOn ( continuity/inclusion) and positioned itself and was 
pos1t10ned (by the elders of the extended political and union family) as the 
advance guard in that ongoing struggle that needed constant renewal and a new 
political morale (rupture). The 'virtual' FESCI hegemony on the campus that 
resulted from this positioning was sustained by populist mobilization tactics that 
staged grass-roots spontaneity and student empowerment but resided on an 
unequal distribution of power and knowledge and resulted in the firm exclusion 
of possible dissidence. 
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FESCI discourse in the contemporary political project of 
autochthony 
Dictatorship is characterized by manifest violence. Mister Gbagbo is inherently 
violent. His whole political career has been based on violence. In 1990 when he 
spoke of multipartyism, he sent the students onto the streets to smash traffic lights, 
bum shops and stealloaves of bread. In 1992, he bumed the entire Plateau district of 
Abidjan, before going to prison in order to pay for it. 
[Journalist:] With the help ofthe FESCI? 
[Soro Guillaume] (laughing). Let me first finish my answer to your question.[ ... ] 
(Fraternite Matin, 2 April2003) 
That is how Soro Guillaume- FESCI's former secretary-general and now Ieader 
of the N ew F orces - presents his erstwhile parents as a gang of raseals and 
pilferers thrown onto the streets by the then opposition Ieader Laurent Gbagbo. 
Nevertheless, Soro Guillaume seems to find it difficult to explicitly identify 
these unruly youngsters as FESCI members. Following the above exchange, the 
interviewee, indeed, 'first answers the question' but he never comesback to the 
issue of the FESCI again in the interview. Surely, it is not easy to characterize 
as instrumentalized the members of an independent union that presented itself 
( and was at some stage presented by Soro Guillaume himself) as an 'auto-
nomous and apolitical movement'. However, Soro Guillaume sees hirnself 
opposed to those many form er F escists who are leading figures in the Y oung 
Patriots movement, as well as to the present-day FESCI union that is a 
prominent member of the Y oung Patriots' Alliance. Above all, what Soro' s 
Statements bring out is that the battle over the FESCI legacy has been won by 
the Young Patriots and that the New Forces have no option other than to 
awkwardly dismiss the student movement, even in its past form. 
Having won the struggle over FESCI's name and ideology, the Young 
Patriots took meanings from it which they do not only use themselves but also 
distribute or insert in the patriotic political discourse of President Laurent 
Gbagbo and his extensive entourage of supporters in political and civil society. 
One prominent figure of what opponents would call Gbagbo's civil society is 
Nyamien Messou, the present Ieader of the SYNARES teachers' union. When, 
during a patriotic talk on national television, Nyamien Messou was asked about 
the apparent success of the Y oung Patriot movement, he responded by saying 
that its success was quite normal and explained hisanswer by situating the new 
movement in a long tradition of resistance of the Ivorian people that began in 
the decolonization period. His historical digression is worth quoting in extenso. 
The Ivorian people have developed a habit. Before independence there was 
resistance. [ ... ]Also in 1951 with the break ofthe RDA away from the Communist 
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Party; later there was the Loi-Cadre [1956] and then the referendum of 1958 to ask 
the Africans whether they wanted independence or to remain as they were. 23 In 1960 
there was also a bit of resistance and all the people of the resistance were thrown 
into prison around 1963 by Felix Houphouet; but the civil resistance continued to 
organize itself around the intellectuals, araund the universities. 
In 1990 the people of Cöte d 'I voire took the opportunity once again to say that they 
wanted to express themselves. With multipartyism the awareness changed. [ ... ] 
Then we arrive at the coup d'etat of 1999. [ ... ] The actors are the same only the 
scenery has changed. Now it is France who sponsors the new coup d'etat [of 2002] 
by multiplying the resources. [ ... ] Also in 1999 the Ivorians did not understand very 
weil what was going on. Now, however, they are more aware, their analytical 
abilities have increased. [ ... ] That is why the civil resistance takes this new form 
different from 1999. (Nyamien Messou on Radio Television lvoire, March 2003) 
This illustrates the main dimensions of continuity/discontinuity and inclusion!-
exclusion that the FESCI developed but that are now inserted in a new political 
project that could be qualified as autochthony-driven (Dozon 2000; Bayart et al. 
2001). As far as the issue of 'imagined continuity' is concemed, the parallels 
with the FESCI discourse are obvious. Messou has constructed a national anti-
imperialist tradition that goes back to the earliest moments of decolonization 
and thus traces a trajectory that coincides with the birth and the coming of age 
of the nation. Furthermore, this nationalist tradition does not reside in the ideas 
or interventions of politicians but is presented as the gradual manifestation of 
the will of the Ivorian people. This gradualness makes for a different approach 
t~ the dimension of rupture. Messou segments the national history whereby the 
dtfferent caesura represent moments of renewed and/or heightened awareness 
and combativeness that have culminated in the present patriotic movement. 
Finally, considering the inclusive/exclusive character of the movement, it can 
be see.n how, in FESCI fashion, the militant scouts and the torch-bearing guides 
of th1s popular ascent to national consciousness are identified as the 
intell~gentsia. N onetheless, the vanguard qualities of the intellectuals are merely 
mentloned and their agency is largely overshadowed by that of an ernerging 
'people'. 
Some striking resemblances between the FESCI discourse and that of the 
patrio.tic m?v~ment. in t?e first few years of the 21st century show certain shifts 
that stgnaltts m~ert10n mto a new-fangled political project. One major shift that 
~ll~ws us to begm to characterize this new project is the one from 'revolution'-
mdtsputably one of the key metaphors of FESCI activism- to 'resistance' the 
central term indicating patriotic militancy. Read in cantrast to the (F~sci) 
23 See footnote 11. 
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'revolution', (patriotic) 'resistance' redefines the different groups of actors 
engaged in the present struggle, as weil as the terrain on which they are 
operating. 
Contrary to revolution and avant-garde ideological struggle, 'resistance' 
emphasizes continuity over rupture and inclusion over exclusion. Such can be 
clearly seen in Messou's story of the gradual up-scaling of national awareness 
among the Ivorian people as a whole. This generalization is of course quite a 
daring one and throws light on the politics of history that informs it. 
In simple historiographic terms, what Messou reconstructs is what Bayart 
(2003) calls the Ivorian 'nationalist tradition' in the form of an ongoing series of 
confrontations - first with the French colonizer, then with the France-friendly 
regime of Houphouet-Boigny, and now with an allegedly French-backed 
rebellion - conceming genuine national sovereignty against colonial, neo-
colonial or contemporary imperialist interference. By equating the history of 
nationalism with that of the nation and by associating the struggle of the 
nationalists with that of the Ivorians, Messou operates a virtual collusion of 'the 
nationalists' with 'the nationals'. In this way, he links up political orientation 
with citizenship and presents adherence to nationalism not so much as engaging 
in politics but rather as performing one's civil duty. Redefined in this way, 
politics and citizenship boil down to the same idealized loyalty to the nation and 
the ruptures and exclusions in this mystifying unity of history, politics and 
population are largely defined along these lines. 
The ones who are seen as standing out in a positive way by showing 
exemplary loyalism are the youth. This is poignantly expressed by Charles 
Groguhet in one of the opening quotes of this chapter. For Groguhet, the 'new 
youth' and 'the new generation' announce the culmination of the 'nationalist 
tradition', the advent of genuine sovereignty and of a new nation. The negative 
equivalent ofthe Young Patriots are the New Forcesand their partisans who are 
not so much presented as political opponents, for instance as 'anti-nationalists', 
but as 'non-nationals' or 'anti-nationals' and generally as 'uncivil' people or 
second-rate ( disloyal or untrustworthy) civilians. 
Apart from being identified within the temporal framewerk of national 
history, the three groups - the young patriots, the patriots/nationals, and the non-
patriots/non-nationals - are also positioned in the spatial framewerk of a 
hegemonic struggle. Here too, the shift from 'revolution' to 'resistance' is an 
analytically helpful one. Making use of Gramsci's terminology, it could be said 
that while revolution is essentially a 'war of manoeuvre' that entails mobility 
and expedition, 'resistance' has all the makings of a 'war of position' that 
resolves around entrenchment and staying power. In patriotic discourse, the 
present war of position is fought on one's own territory with 'the weapons of 
the weak'. 
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The 'weapons' that the patnotlc movement claims to possess combine 
physicaVmilitary weakness with strength of spirit. Both meanings figure 
prominently in the quote by Bernard Dadie at the beginning of this chapter. By 
describing the hands of the new youth as 'unarmed' and with 'no intention of 
grabhing a portfolio', Dadie invites us to read 'resistance' as combining the 
sticks-and-stones street violence of youngsters with their tenacity and 
incurruptibility. Likewise, their opponents are characterized as ideologically 
spineless and self-seeking political entrepreneurs who, because of their 
(financial) backing by exterior imperialist forces, possess the kind of superior 
professional weapons with which they crush the will of the people. 
This entire characterization of the warring parties is highly reminiscent of 
FESCI descriptions of itself as an 'anti-political movement' facing an 
opportunistic regime that is 'armed to the teeth'. The main difference lies in the 
space in which this battle unfolds. The discourse of continuity and inclusion that 
the FESCI developed had a strong horizontal dimension that was articulated 
through the occupation of public space ( demonstrations ), geopolitical expansion 
( expatriation), and claims of expressing the popular 'will'. This spatial 
dimensionwas supplemented by a temporal (vertical) one by which the FESCI 
inscribed itself in the nationalist struggle. What we see happening in the 
discourse of the Y oung Patriots, and is attested by Charles Groguhet' s quote at 
the beginning of the chapter, is the extension of this temporal dimension to 
include 'the ancestors'. In such a way, Groguhet is working towards 
conditioning patriotic loyalty on Ivorian ancestry. 
Conclusion 
Most studies of autochthony movements in Africa and far beyond agree that 
their breeding ground needs to be situated at the conjunction of economic 
(globalization), political (democratization) and socio-economic (freeing of 
labour) developments (Bayart et al. 2001; Geschiere & Nyamnjoh 2000). I have 
tried to show elsewhere (Arnaut 2004b) that, in the case of Cöte d'Ivoire, 
autochthony also needs to be situated in a long national history of catego-
rizations of people along different lines ( ethnic, religious, political, in terms of 
nationality) because it rearticulates existing categories into the autochthone-
allochthone dichotomy. This chapter may be read as a case study in this broader 
project that seeks to excavate the layers of older discourses that can be found in 
the present autochthony rhetoric. 
Other authors have noticed the importance of youth and student 
organizations in the development of autochthony movements, for instance in 
Cameroon (Konings this volume) and, in the case ofCöte d'Ivoire ofthe FESCI 
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and the Young Patriots in reshaping the political Iandscape (Konate 2003, 
Banegas & Marshall-Fratani 2000). Overall, one can observe in these studies a 
strong inclination as to how youth and student organizations are instrument-
alized by older political Ieaders. This, of course, is often contradicted by the 
youth movements themselves, not least by the Young Patriots in Cöte d'Ivoire, 
by stressing their independence as a grass-roots popular movement and 
claiming ideological autonomy. In its theoretical outlook and its analytical focus 
and by the choice of its empirical material, this chapter seeks to transcend this 
divide between instrumentalization and autonomy. 
The central argument is that one of the key players in the present-day 
autochthony movement in Cöte d'Ivoire - the Young Patriots - is reclaiming 
central elements of discourse from the FESCI student union and is inscribing 
these in a new political project that is being carried by the FPI socialist party 
and is embodied by current Presidcnt Laurent Gbagbo. This discursive 
continuity or stability can in itself be taken as demonstrating the relative 
'autonomy' of the student movement since the 1990s. Looking further into 
which discursive elements are being transferred, we get a better grasp of what, 
in the way of discursive constructions, the Y oung Patriots have to offer to the 
autochthony movement. 
The theoretical option taken in this chapter posits a fundamental coevalness 
between scholars and social actors in their co·nceptualization of youth and 
generation. 24 F or both groups, it is argued, the latter concepts walk a fine ( and 
often ambiguously vague) line between continuity and rupture, inclusion and 
exclusion. This is attested by a review of the scholarly Iiterature on youth and 
generation, and by an in-depth analysis of the FES CI discourse. Turning then to 
the transfer and contribution ( willing or not) of the FES CI to the Y oung Patriots 
movement, we can begin to discern that, on essential points, the youngsters are 
strategic partners of the socialist party and President Gbagbo in the articulation 
and, above all, the attempted imposition of their new, autochthony-driven 
political project. It would require more space to sufficiently argue the latter 
point but my analysis so far leads me to believe that the survival of Gbagbo as 
the carrier of the hegemonic struggle he currently embodies depends to a large 
extent on his deep association with the ideas and manifestations of the Y oung 
Patriots. Whether Gbagbo and/or the Y oung Patriots survive or not is another 
24 The concept of 'coevalness' was introduced ~nto ant_hrorol?gy b~ ~abi~n 0?83) 
when he denounced the anthropologists' denial to share time wtth thetr subJ~C~s a~d 
instead suggested that they engage in a dialectical relationship with them. T~ts tdea ts 
taken to heart in this chapter, as well as Kelly's (1999: 264) further elaborat~on o~ t~e 
challenge of coevalness, namely that anthropologists must 'seek the temporahty wtthm 
the "political confrontations already in place"'. 
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question altogether, but it is difficult to imagine at this point how any 
alternative political Ieader will be able to formulate a new future for Cöte 
d'Ivoire without taking on board the 'youth' that over the last decade and more 
have so thoroughly inscribed themselves in projects for the regeneration of the 
Ivorian nation. 
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War, changing ethics and the 
position of youth in South Sudan 
Jok Madut Jok 
Introduction 
This chapter considers the position of youth and children in the 
context of the on-going war in Sudan, focusing in particular on 
the war-provoked and growing contradiction between norms 
held by the Dinka about the importance of children and child-
bearing and what young people went through during the second 
round of the north-south conjlict on the other. Three questions 
are asked. What are the belieft and values that place children 
at the centre of people 's social and cultural lives? Are the 
current youth-related issues a result of war or are they ordinary 
socio-cultural changes that every society must undergo? What 
do Sudanese communities and humanitarian aid agencies 
reckon are the main problems facing youth or caused by youth, 
and what solutions are envisaged? The conclusion arrived at is 
that violence perpetrated by or exercised against youth is not 
just the immediate outcome of a prolonged war but is also the 
sharp end of a lang historical process. 
Much of the Iiterature on wartime violence tends to focus on the use of extreme 
violence used by the warring parties against civilians under each other' s control 
as a means of fighting the war, i.e. to destabilize the opposing group's support 
base. But important as it is to document such abuses, equally important and 
most insidious are the ways in which violence is carried out within the 
communities by members of armed groups who hail from these same com-
munities. The emergence of sub-cultures of violence during armed conflicts, as 
seen in Sierra Leone, Sudan, Liberia, northem Uganda and other countries, has 
